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Abstract  
 
 
This paper explores leadership and governance arrangements in seven developed health 
systems: Australia, England, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It 
presents a cybernetic model of leadership and governance comprising three fundamental 
functions: priority setting, performance monitoring and accountability arrangements. The 
paper uses a structured survey to examine critically current arrangements in the seven 
countries. Approaches to leadership and governance vary substantially, and have to date been 
developed piecemeal and somewhat arbitrarily. Although there seems to be reasonable 
consensus on broad goals of the health system there is variation in approaches to setting 
priorities. Cost-effectiveness analysis is in widespread use as a basis for operational priority 
setting, but rarely plays a central role. Performance monitoring may be the domain where 
there is most convergence of thinking, although countries are at different stages of 
development. The third domain of accountability is where the greatest variation occurs, and 
where there is greatest uncertainty about the optimal approach. We conclude that a judicious 
mix of accountability mechanisms is likely to be appropriate in most settings, including 
market mechanisms, electoral processes, direct financial incentives, and professional 
oversight and control. The mechanisms should be aligned with the priority setting and 
monitoring processes. 
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Introduction 
 
The World Health Report 2000 introduced the notion of a government’s responsibility for the 
‘stewardship’ of the health system, which “encompasses the tasks of defining the vision and 
direction of health policy, exerting influence through regulation and advocacy, and collecting 
and using information” [1]. The notion was subsequently refined and characterized by the 
World Health Organization as ‘leadership and governance’, which “involves ensuring 
strategic policy frameworks exist and are combined with effective oversight, coalition 
building, the provision of appropriate regulations and incentives, attention to system-design, 
and accountability” [2]. Leadership and governance is generally considered to be the most 
complex but also the most important function of government in relation to its health system.  
 
Governance can be defined as social coordination and three main types are usually described 
in the literature: hierarchy, market and network [3, 4]. They rest on different theoretical bases 
(for example, theories of bureaucracy, economics, sociology) and require different actions 
from government. A hierarchy implies a need to define rules, allocate resources and 
responsibilities, with an implication of top-down direct control. A market implies an 
emphasis on purchasing, regulation, and creating incentives. A reliance on networks implies 
the need to establish common values and knowledge, and management through professional 
norms and information.  
 
Ouchi [5] argues that the choice of optimal organizational control in a specific situation 
depends on two broad contextual considerations: the knowledge of the production process 
and the ability to measure outputs. Markets are optimal when knowledge of the production 
process is poor but outputs can be accurately measured – that is, when contracts can be 
readily written and performance monitored by observing outputs. Conversely, hierarchies 
might be preferred when knowledge of the production process is good but outputs are 
difficult to measure – that is, when behaviour can be readily controlled through rules of 
process. When information on both production process and output measurement is poor, the 
organization may have to resort to what Ouchi calls ‘clan control’, under which performance 
is determined by social and cultural norms rather than markets or bureaucracies. 
 Traditional model of governance were based on hierarchy, but developed towards mixed 
models including market and network types. This requires new and more general approaches 
to governance as governments relinquish some aspects of direct control.  A focus on 
leadership and governance therefore does not necessarily imply a need for government itself 
to finance, provide or otherwise directly control health system resources. Rather, this 
perspective emphasizes the responsibility of government for ensuring that goals are 
articulated, that necessary systems, capacity, incentives and information are in place to assure 
attainment, and that all stakeholders are able to exert appropriate influence on the actions and 
performance of the system. Indeed, the emphasis upon stakeholders implies that the state 
cannot impose ‘top-down’ governance. It is likely that - given the diffusion of power in 
modern economies - the state must mobilize networks of power in order to steer events [6]. In 
a typically complex health system no one actor has all the knowledge and power to get things 
done and the state must therefore necessarily engage in networked governance across many 
organizations.  
 
The concept of leadership and governance is relatively new in health, and there is little 
consensus on how to define, model or measure stewardship of the health system [7]. 
However, management theorists and political scientists have well-established more general 
models in this domain. In particular, analogies have been drawn between the need to ‘steer’ 
physical or biological entities, and the need to exercise governance of social systems. Such 
models have been described by authors such as Beer [8] as ‘cybernetic’, derived from the 
Greek word κυβερνητης (kybernetes - a steersman), which is also the root for the word 
‘governance’. Osborne and Gaebler [9] note that states now seek to ‘steer rather than row’ 
their developed economies.  
 
Other authors [10] rely on system thinking to gain a deeper understanding of the process 
necessary to implement a given intervention in the real-world setting. Only by taking all the 
relevant implications into account, including how the system will react, what synergies can 
be developed and what negative behaviour might be expected, can one ensure that the design 
of the intervention is robust and the intended result will emerge. Veillard et al [11] propose 
an operational framework for assessing the stewardship function of health ministries. The 
relevance of such models to the analysis and strengthening of health systems is clear. Under 
the World Health Organization definition stated above, leadership and governance involve 
setting priorities for the maintenance and improvement of the population’s health, assessing 
progress towards attainment of those priorities, and ensuring that all relevant actors are held 
properly to account for their actions. Following Smith and Goddard [12], we summarize this 
process with reference to three key components: setting priorities, monitoring performance, 
and holding to account. Although necessarily a simplification, this three-part model captures 
many of the essential features of the leadership and governance challenge. It is illustrated in 
Figure 1, a representation that underlines the notion of performance feedback inherent in 
successful governance of the health system. This emphasizes the function of ‘steering’ the 
systems under scrutiny. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Priority setting 
Priority setting can be defined as a more or less systematic approach to distributing the 
available resources among demands to fashion an optimal health care system, given system 
constraints [13]. The most fundamental element of priority setting is to ensure that a clear set 
of goals is articulated for the health system to act as a basis for such optimization. Experience 
since the World Health Report 2000 suggests that the principal goals are likely to include 
variants of the following: 
 Improved health status of the population  
 Safe, high quality health services  
 Responsive health services, meeting the expectations of patients and caregivers 
 Equitable treatment and outcomes  
 Financial protection from the expenditure consequences of ill health 
 Ensuring a sustainable supply and efficient use of resources 
 
The precise formulation of goals, and the degree of importance attached to them, is a matter 
for individual nations to determine. It is largely a political decision, but there are available 
frameworks that can help to guide the debate [14]. In practice, high-level goals do not differ 
substantially between health systems. The task of priority setting is to convert the chosen 
high-level goals into targets and operational actions for the health system. In contrast, these 
are likely to vary considerably depending on local circumstances such as pressures on the 
health services budget and local priorities [15]. 
  
Priority setting can take a number of forms, such as required standards of service or 
aspirational targets of attainment [13]. A common form of priority setting in systems both of 
mandated health insurance and of devolved tax funding involves the specification of a set of 
health services (the health basket) to which insurees are entitled [16]. Increasingly, parts of 
the health basket are being shaped at the national level by agencies at arm’s length from 
government, using techniques such as cost-effectiveness analysis. It is quite common to 
observe other priority-setting approaches, often running alongside the health basket, such as 
targets for health improvement, standards for patient safety, or waiting times and other access 
guarantees. 
 
Performance monitoring 
The IT revolution has transformed our ability to capture vast quantities of data on the inputs 
and activities of the health system. The immediate stimulus for providing better information 
has been to improve the delivery of health care by securing appropriate treatment and good 
outcomes for patients. Without access to reliable and timely information on the patient’s 
medical history, health status and personal circumstances, the clinician will often be unable to 
provide optimal care, and wasteful duplication and delay may also occur. Similarly, patients 
often lack the information required to make choices about treatment and provider congruent 
with their individual preferences and values and offering the best potential health outcomes. 
 
More generally, information is also a key resource for securing managerial, political and 
democratic control of the health system – in short, for improving its governance. There have 
been astonishing developments in the scope, nature and timeliness of performance data made 
publicly available in most developed health systems [17]. Performance monitoring can be 
defined as the systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of data to inform 
stakeholders of the actions and outcomes associated with practitioners, organizations and 
entire health systems. There are many diverse uses of performance information, such as 
tracking public health, monitoring health care safety, determining appropriate treatment paths 
for patients, promoting professional improvement, assuring managerial control, and 
promoting the accountability of the health system to citizens. Underlying all of these efforts 
is the role it plays in enhancing the decisions that patients, clinicians, managers, governments 
and citizens take in steering the health system towards better outcomes. A primary purpose of 
performance information is therefore to promote transparency throughout the health system 
and to enable stakeholders to hold actors within the health system properly to account. 
 Accountability mechanisms 
Specification of priorities and performance monitoring has little purpose if relevant actors do 
not have the power to use the results to effect change. For example, Mannion and Goddard 
[18] found that performance monitoring in Scotland was well advanced in the mid 1990s. 
However, it had little impact on health system behaviour because of a lack of accountability 
mechanisms and the associated incentives to prompt appropriate responses on the part of 
practitioners, managers and organizations. The same phenomenon can be observed at a 
national level – for example, the biennial Dutch Health Care Performance Report [19] has 
been slow to inform the policy debate and national priority setting. 
 
Stewart [20] argues that accountability has two broad elements: the rendering of an account 
(provision of performance information), and the consequent holding to account (sanctions or 
rewards for the accountable party). The availability of performance information is therefore 
not in itself sufficient to promote accountability. There must also be put in place appropriate 
accountability mechanisms – arrangements that allow stakeholders to express their judgments 
on service providers and – where necessary – encourage them to take remedial action. Such 
mechanisms might include markets in which patients or payers can choose which providers 
they use, democratic processes in which the public passes periodic electoral judgment on 
relevant agencies, direct incentives through payment or accreditation systems, and the 
oversight of providers through professional regulation or through reputational pressure from 
the judgments of professional peers. The common feature is that they imply some incentive 
for the provider to take action. 
 
All nations have put in place governance institutions and systems that – to some extent – 
address the need for priority setting, performance monitoring and accountability. However, 
the precise scope, design and effectiveness of such mechanisms vary considerably. The 
objective of this paper is to explore the current state of progress in health system governance 
in seven countries: Australia, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland. In particular, it describes the relevant arm’s length institutions that have been 
put in place and the methods they use, assesses the scope and effectiveness of their operation, 
and discusses the extent to which, as a whole, they serve the leadership and governance 
requirements of the health system. 
 
There is no single accepted definition of an arm’s length institution. The OECD [21] 
describes them as assuming government responsibilities “at arm’s length from the control of 
politicians, with different hierarchical structures from traditionally functioning ministries and 
in some cases management autonomy or independence from political influence”. They have 
been created with two objectives in mind: to improve efficiency and effectiveness, or to 
legitimize decision-making independent of political influence. The key ways in which they 
differ from traditional ministries include: different governance structures; exemption from 
certain managerial, financial, or personnel rules; and a degree of management autonomy. The 
common feature is a desire to distance the detailed operations of the agency from day-to-day 
political scrutiny and control. Of course this can be effective only if the agency is given very 
clear terms of reference and authority. The OECD describes such arrangements as 
“distributed governance” [21]. 
 
The countries were chosen to reflect a range of health system arrangements in high income 
countries with universal health coverage, largely financed by mandatory contributions in the 
form of taxation or social health insurance. Table 1 summarizes key national health statistics, 
highlighting the similarities in many of the measures [22, 23]. In contrast, Table 2 gives a 
broad comparison of their health system characteristics, highlighting considerable variation in 
structures of governance.  A key unresolved debate is the optimal extent of decentralized 
control within health systems [24], and we sought to reflect a spectrum from the considerable 
decentralization found in countries such as Switzerland and Sweden to the high levels of 
centralized control found in England and Norway. Clearly the issues involved in ‘steering’ 
the system are very different depending on the degree and type of decentralization in place, 
and this issue is a key focus of our discussion.  
 
< Tables 1 and 2 about here > 
  
The study takes advantage of an author from each country who is familiar with the health 
system and relevant policy developments. Consistent responses were sought through a semi-
structured questionnaire, summarized in Annex 1, developed in discussion with all authors in 
order to avoid misinterpretation or ambiguity. In the next section we summarize for each 
country experience under the three leadership domains, and assess the extent to which they 
are aligned. A concluding section discusses the findings and draws conclusions for future 
priorities.  
 Summary of findings 
 
The survey results are reported in full elsewhere[25]. In this section we summarize the key 
findings from individual countries. To a large extent the state of progress within a country 
can be assessed by reporting the type and effectiveness of the institutions that have been put 
in place to undertake the leadership and governance functions described above. Therefore, as 
a framework for the discussion, Table 3 summarizes relevant agencies in the seven countries 
under scrutiny. 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
Australia 
Australia has a federal system of government with functional and fiscal responsibilities 
divided between the national government and the six states and two territories who 
administer respective regional health systems. Health care is offered by both public and 
private providers; medical services are subsidized through the government health insurance 
system (Medicare); approved pharmaceuticals are subsidized; and public hospital care is free 
for public patients. Financing comes from general taxation, a small health tax levy and some 
user co-payments. In addition, although private health insurance is voluntary, the Australian 
government offers financial incentives and sanctions for people to take out private insurance 
cover for private hospital care and some private allied health services [26].  
 
Setting priorities is a joint responsibility of the national government and the states and 
territories. A number of national agencies and forums have been established to help inform 
priorities, for example, the Australian National Preventive Health Agency. Australia has been 
a leading user of health technology assessment (HTA) and its National E-Health Transition 
Authority now aims to establish secure interoperable electronic health information systems. 
The Australian Health Ministers’ Conference agrees national priorities. The Council of 
Australian Governments has recently taken steps to strengthen performance monitoring. The 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care leads initiatives and proposes 
standards but has no formal powers of intervention. The federal government aims to 
strengthen performance monitoring and accountability in relation to public hospitals through 
the establishment in 2011 of a Hospital Pricing Authority and a National Health Performance 
Authority. The prime accountability mechanisms are via intergovernmental forums, the 
national and state health departments, accreditation of provider organizations, and the 
Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Agency established in 2010.  
 
Australia has generally adopted a ‘soft’ regulation approach entailing persuasion and 
collaboration in preference to a harder regime entailing enforcement. Whilst the decentralized 
nature of the health system can promote innovation and responsiveness to local conditions, it 
also fragments accountability. Efforts are under way to improve accountability arrangements 
through the promulgation of national minimum standards, and public performance reporting. 
However, it remains unclear what sanctions or supports follow upon poor performance by the 
states or their public hospitals in meeting public priorities, and accountability in the private 
sector remains weak.  
  
England 
The English National Health Service (NHS) has traditionally been the archetypal centrally 
planned health system, offering universal insurance funded mainly from general taxation. 
Services remain largely free at the point of access. However, the NHS has increasingly 
separated the functions of provider and purchaser of health services, and now relies 
increasingly on a mixed market of public, not-for-profit and commercial providers. Patients 
are free to choose any approved provider for much non-emergency hospital care, supported 
by a system of diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments [27]. The policies of a new (2010) 
coalition government have reinforced the emphasis on provider markets, in which 
performance information is expected to play a major role. 
 
The Care Quality Commission assesses organizational compliance with a large set of ‘core 
standards’ developed in conjunction with the health ministry, which forms the principal 
priority setting mechanism. Much of the assessment is self-reported, but there is a significant 
threat of audit and inspection. The other main priority setting mechanism in England is the 
health technology assessment undertaken by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE). NICE is also seeking to integrate best practice quality standards into its 
recommendations. Performance measurement has been at the heart of recent reforms, and is 
therefore relatively well developed, both in primary and hospital care. A private organization 
Dr Foster also offers assessments of NHS hospitals, including standardized hospital mortality 
rates. Traditionally, accountability in the English NHS has focused on the hierarchical 
managerial relationship between NHS organizations and the health ministry. However, recent 
policy has focused on market accountability, including encouragement of a more diverse 
provider market; reform of provider payment mechanisms; the development of patient choice 
guarantees; improved information on provider performance; and efforts to create a level 
playing field for market participants.  
 
The broad requirements to support a more market-oriented model are being put in place, 
albeit in a piecemeal fashion. The main weaknesses of the system at present are the lack of 
information on large parts of the health system that might be useful to patients, and the limits 
to real choice and contestability at many stages of the patient pathway. And an impending 
severe spending squeeze on NHS finances will limit the scope for creating new capacity. 
 
Germany 
Germany has a system of statutory social health insurance (SHI). The bulk of the population 
(85%) receives coverage from around 160 competing health insurance funds (sickness funds) 
– autonomous, not-for-profit, non-governmental bodies under public law – funded through 
joint contributions by employer and employee. Of the remainder, about 10% are covered 
through private health insurance based on a different set of regulations, and 4% are covered 
directly by the government [28]. A fundamental characteristic of the political system in 
Germany is the separation of powers between the federal level (with a constitutional 
emphasis on parliament and relatively weak powers granted to the government), the states 
(both individually as well as participants in federal policy-making) and various corporatist 
institutions. It leads to a relatively strong degree of delegated and autonomous decision 
making. 
 
The Federal Joint Committee (G-BA), established in 2004 represents sickness funds, 
ambulatory care physicians as well as hospitals. It is the paramount priority setting body in 
the SHI scheme’s system of joint self-government. Amongst its principal responsibilities, the 
G-BA defines the benefit basket of the SHI system, and takes responsibility for assessing the 
quality and efficiency of care. Its work is in part supported by HTA reports undertaken by the 
Institute for Quality and Efficiency (IQWiG). Increasing performance measurement efforts 
are being made [29]. Since 2010 the Institut für angewandte Qualitätsförderung und 
Forschung im Gesundheitswesen (AQUA) has taken responsibility for wide scale 
performance reporting in an anonymized way, associated analysis, and seeking responses 
from underperforming providers [30]. All hospitals are also expect to publish publicly a suite 
of 27 performance measures as part of the mandatory biennial quality reports. Accountability 
is secured through systems of various statutory and voluntary accreditation schemes, at the 
organizational and practitioner level, and the freedom of patients to choose provider. 
 
In some senses the high degree of delegated decision-making is the strength of the German 
system. Granting the power for priority setting, performance assessment and expenditure 
control to actors inside the system, requiring them to take decisions that balance different 
interests and making them jointly accountable, ties decision-making and accountability 
together. However, governmental powers and accountability vis-à-vis the population at large 
are considerably weaker than in other countries. Various non-governmental actors can block 
decisions and thereby delay the implementation of priorities and regulations intended by law. 
Over the last 20 years, coalitions of various parties have tried to overcome this dilemma by 
strengthening the role of the government vis-à-vis the corporatist actors, e.g. through merging 
the various sectoral joint committees into one, trying to set up a governmental agency for 
quality (which ended up as IQWiG under corporatist control) or by creating the national 
health fund, which is administered by the Federal Insurance Authority (which is also charged 
with supervising the sickness funds). 
 
Netherlands 
Over a period of 20 years the Netherlands has moved from a health system based on 
traditional social health insurance (with voluntary private insurance for higher income 
families) towards a system of competitive health insurers offering a mandatory package of 
care for the whole population [31]. An important feature of the Dutch reforms has been a 
long-term vision of what is to be achieved, and incremental implementation, requiring a 
degree of political consensus on the desired future shape of the health system. The vision 
comprises a system of ‘managed competition’ in both the insurance and provider markets, 
with the intention of controlling the activities, quality and costs of the health system. The 
markets are overseen by the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa), which sets payment rates 
and has the power to impose obligations on players with significant market power. It also 
seeks to improve the transparency of markets for purchasers and patients. The Health Care 
Inspectorate (IGZ) establishes minimum quality standards. 
 
Overall responsibility for priority setting rests with the Minister of Health, who is responsible 
for the access, quality and costs of Dutch health care. The ministry and, when necessary, the 
legislature set strategic priorities. A number of arm’s length agencies are then responsible for 
more operational priority setting, including the Health Council (advises the government on 
the state of the art in medicine, health care, public health and environmental protection), the 
Health Care Insurance Board (CVZ) which advises on the contents and implementation of the 
basic health insurance package, and the Medicines Evaluation Board (CBG), which assesses 
and safeguards the efficacy, safety and quality of medicinal products. Performance 
monitoring is central to the implementation of managed competition. All providers and 
insurers must produce an annual accountability report, including information on costs, 
activity and quality. This includes information for consumers on a website (KiesBeter.nl). In 
addition, the independent National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) 
produces a biennial national report on the performance of the health system, which is 
presented to Parliament as a means of holding the health ministry to account for its 
stewardship of the health system [19]. Managed competition places great emphasis on 
markets as an important mechanism for securing improved accountability. The requirements 
for markets to function efficiently include transparent information and meaningful choice for 
individual patients and collective purchasers (the insurance funds). The health care authority 
NZa has primary responsibility for ensuring that markets function appropriately, whilst the 
Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) enforces fair competition amongst both insurers and 
providers, which are subject to the Dutch Competition Act. The minimum standards set by 
the health care inspectorate IGZ act as an accountability mechanism in the form of 
accreditation. Self-regulation, particularly of the medical profession, is also an important 
aspect of the Dutch system. 
 
The Dutch health system is conceived as a system, albeit one towards which progress is being 
made incrementally. Therefore, unlike most other health systems, there is an ambition to 
align all three elements of leadership and governance. It is recognized that the reforms will 
take many years to complete and so far progress has been variable. In particular, there has 
been a (probably necessary) reliance on existing institutions to take on many of the roles of 
priority setting, performance monitoring, and accountability. However, reforms to date have 
been implemented with a consistent vision in mind, and the roles and responsibilities of 
relevant arm’s length bodies are therefore moderately well aligned. The greatest challenge is 
to align priority setting for the short and the long term, performance monitoring and the 
associated system responses. Recently the Minister of Health initiated the establishment of a 
national Quality Institute that has the power to enforce change and integrates the knowledge 
of the various institutes involved (CVZ, IGZ, NZa, research units). 
 
Norway 
Norway’s health system is funded mainly through taxation. There are three levels of 
government: the national Parliament (Storting), 19 county councils and 430 municipalities. 
The municipalities are in charge of primary care, care for older people and care of physically 
and mentally disabled people; the counties deal with health promotion and dental care; and 
the central government is responsible for secondary care. Health reform in the 1970s was 
concerned with equity issues and developing health services; the 1980s focused on 
decentralization and cost containment; the 1990s on leadership and efficiency issues; and the 
2000s on delivery and organization of the health system [32].  
 
At the national level, an overarching National Health Plan (at present for 2011-2015) forms 
the basis for strategic priority setting. In primary care, local priorities are set mainly by the 
individual municipalities. Secondary care is governed by the four regional health authorities 
(RHAs), and priorities are set by way of contracts with the national ministry, which outline 
what hospitals are expected to deliver over the next year with regard to quantity, quality and 
areas requiring improvement. The Council for Quality Improvement and Priority Setting in 
Health Care (under the roof of the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services)  
deals with questions of national importance and great cost, for instance regarding introducing 
new screening programs for cancer or  the introduction of new expensive medications or 
procedures.  Performance measurement, in the form of targets to be achieved, forms a central 
aspect of the contracts. In primary care, most municipalities have some system for measuring 
performance, although their efforts are not coordinated at a national level and mainly focus 
on treatment volume and other structural measures.  
 
There are many shortcomings in the current arrangements. Most measurement focuses on 
structures or volume rather than outcomes, so is not useful in improving quality. Public 
reporting of results is limited and results are not published in a user-friendly way. There is 
also a lack of capacity to analyze data. Performance monitoring therefore adds low value, as 
little or nothing is done to enforce change or improvement. Accountability relies thus mainly 
on administrative processes (as represented by the RHA contracts) rather than markets or 
electoral processes. 
 
The Patients’ Right law promises a patient treatment within a specified time frame, and this is 
usually monitored. If a hospital fails to provide the treatment within that period, the patient 
has the right to seek treatment – whether it be private or public – elsewhere and the failing 
hospital has to pay for the cost incurred. To this extent the three components are aligned. 
However, there is otherwise little alignment between priority setting, performance monitoring 
and accountability. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden has three independent levels of government all involved in the health system: 
national, county and municipality. The health system is primarily funded through national 
and local taxation [33]. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs initiates goals and policies 
at the national level. Service delivery and financing is the responsibility of the local 
authorities, which own most providers. The 21 county councils play a major role in the 
Swedish health system. Each should offer good health and medical services to persons 
residing within its boundary. The 290 municipalities are responsible for nursing home care 
help in the delivery of services for older people. Since 2005, reforms have centered on 
attempts to integrate services and avoid fragmentation, transparent comparison of health care 
performance, and choice and privatization in primary care delivery.  
 
All three government levels are responsible for setting priorities for health system actions 
and standards. Overall goals and policies are determined at the national level, and the national 
government has also invested resources in building a strong national evidence base for local 
decision-making through arm’s length agencies. Cost-effectiveness in prescribing is 
promoted through the reimbursement decisions and recommendations of TLV, a national 
HTA agency for dental and pharmaceutical benefits. Since 2006 performance monitoring 
efforts have focused on clinical indicators and performance-related outcomes referred to as 
Öppna jämförelser (“open comparison”), a transparent comparison of quality and clinical 
indicators across the 21 county councils. The association of local governments (county 
councils) generally carries out performance monitoring in collaboration with the National 
Board of Health and Welfare. Quality registers for specific treatments are managed 
independently with the support of the national government through specialized organizations. 
The national government can in principle hold the county councils accountable for 
obligations covered by the Health Care Act. However, the Act describes responsibilities for 
local government in general terms, so this does not happen in practice. Increasingly, the 
national government is using direct incentives, such as pay-for-performance related to 
waiting time targets, to influence developments at the county level. The main accountability 
mechanism for the county councils is the electoral choice of the local population. Market 
mechanisms and choice for the population have traditionally been limited, but have recently 
been strengthened, most notably in primary care.  
 
In summary, the Swedish system has some way to go. Priority setting is not transparent, other 
than for prescription drugs (through HTA) and the hospital waiting time guarantee. It is not 
aligned with performance monitoring, which is weak compared to some other countries. 
Performance information at the provider level is limited, and its main use relates to 
managerial benchmarking. On the other hand, the system of quality registers does offer the 
potential for detailed benchmarking of professionals and organizations. Accountability 
mechanisms generally come to light during elections at all three levels, and the impact of 
greater use of market incentives has yet to be assessed.  
 
Switzerland  
Switzerland has three institutional levels: the confederation (central state), the cantons and 
the municipalities. The political system is characterized on the one hand by federalism and 
direct democracy and, on the other hand, by liberalism and private institutions that play a 
significant role even in social security. The health system is mostly funded by compulsory 
health insurance premiums and taxes. Federal-level intervention is limited, but the position of 
the central government in health policy issues has become more significant over the past 
decade. Responsibility for the financing, organization and delivery of health services lies with 
cantons, large municipalities, health insurers, as well as public and private providers. A 
fundamental health reform in 1996 introduced compulsory health insurance across the 
country with a nationally standardized benefits package [34]. Citizens can choose from a 
market of non-profit insurers offering statutory coverage. 
 
Priority setting is a responsibility shared by federal government, cantons and, in the field of 
elderly care, even municipalities. Depending on the issue at hand, the federal government, the 
cantons, the organization of health insurers, the provider associations and the 
patient/consumer associations take part in the decision-making process. The federal 
government is responsible for defining the statutory benefits package and the Federal Service 
Board (FSB) is responsible for recommendations in the area of medical treatments. However, 
it has limited resources and its deliberations are not transparent. To fill this gap, in 2008 the 
canton of Zurich set up its own agency, called the Medical Board (MB). In 2011, the cantons 
accepted to anchor the agency at federal level, demonstrating that MB has the potential to 
become a true arm’s length agency for HTA. Performance monitoring is limited [35]. 
Performance indicators pertaining to quality of care are not collected systematically and there 
is no country-wide program that sets standards of care quality. Monitoring is generally 
carried out by the cantonal authorities jointly with provider associations and the 
confederation is of subsidiary importance. A federal agency called SwissDRG has been 
created to run the DRG system through systematic collection of microdata from all hospitals 
and in a certain sense measuring performance in the hospital sector. A nascent Patient Safety 
Foundation has also been formed, under the aegis of a number of stakeholders, but is at an 
early stage of development. Accountability relies predominantly on consumer choice, control 
by professional peers and continuing education requirement for physicians, and voluntary 
accreditation schemes for hospitals. But it is not ensured in a systemic way as a result of the 
weaknesses highlighted in performance monitoring and priority setting. In January 2011 the 
federal government presented a draft bill aiming to strengthen control and accountability of 
health insurers through a powerful regulatory agency at federal level. 
 
Thus leadership and governance in the Swiss Federation is highly fragmented [35]. The 
proper functioning of insurance and provider markets is frustrated by weak information and 
lack of transparency. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The brief country sketches identified a large number of arm’s length agencies, as summarized 
in Table 3. The findings indicate a variety of approaches to leadership and governance. This 
section discusses the results under the three domains, and draws some conclusions for future 
developments.  
 
Setting priorities 
Setting goals for the health system is a clearly political undertaking, and a proper role for a 
legitimately elected government. We have found that some of the important goals of health 
systems are reasonably uncontested in practice. Few argue with the need to assure the quality 
and safety of health services. However, other goals such as maximizing efficiency or 
promoting equity are more problematic. Whilst the pursuit of health system efficiency or 
equity would for many observers be a ‘good thing’, converting those general principles into a 
concrete concept, let alone a measurable indicator or target, is not straightforward. 
 
Of the countries under scrutiny, only Germany, Norway, England and - to a lesser extent - 
Australia have a formal system of setting comprehensive and clear goals for the health 
system. Although setting high-level goals is a manifestly political undertaking, a system of 
agencies advising the health ministry, such as that found in the Netherlands, might be the 
most appropriate way of informing a government’s choice of national priorities. However, it 
runs the risk of somewhat arbitrary choice of goals, and is vulnerable to capture by vested 
interests. It also encounters difficulties in more devolved systems in which local states, 
counties or cantons have the freedom to depart from national priorities. Australia seeks to set 
and implement national priorities through intergovernmental and intersectoral forums. The 
Norwegian Council for Quality Improvement and Priority Setting in Health Care acts as a 
forum for debating priorities, recognizing the political nature of the task, but also using 
evidence produced by the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for Health Services. 
 
A lack of any statement of goals can make operational priority setting problematic. Priority 
setting is particularly important in a system of mandatory health insurance. Insurers, patients 
and payers must in principle be told what treatments and diseases the mandatory insurance 
package should cover, who is entitled to receive care, and the standards of quality they can 
expect. Only with a clear picture of patient entitlements can insurers, providers and 
governments be held properly to account. In practice, such clarity is rarely found. There is in 
developed health systems an assumption that all ‘reasonable’ treatments should be covered, 
to an ‘acceptable’ level of quality. It has traditionally been rare to find explicit statements of 
entitlement. However in many health systems the capacity to deliver a comprehensive 
package is coming under increasing pressure, as financial pressures increase and variability in 
the quality of provision is exposed. The need for clearer statements of priorities then becomes 
apparent. For example in Switzerland the lack of a national priority setting agency led the 
cantons to launch the Medical Board initiative, a multilateral body that provides “bottom-up” 
HTA recommendations, aiming at revitalizing the public debate on priority setting and 
guidelines. 
 
So long as clear national goals are set, and agreement reached on how they are to be made 
operational, the detailed work of setting priorities can be delegated to an arm’s length 
organization. The goals of improving cost effectiveness, maximizing the health of the 
population, and assuring patient safety underlie the operations of many of the agencies 
described above. For example, most health systems with universal insurance coverage seek – 
implicitly or explicitly – to maximize health for a given budget. The generally accepted 
approach to making this principle operational is the application of cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA) to the assessment of health technologies. To varying extents, there has been some 
progress in making that principle operational amongst the countries surveyed.  
 
Australia has a long tradition of using CEA to assess new drugs. In England NICE has led 
international practice in the methodology and processes of HTA, and its technology guidance 
is mandatory. In Sweden TLV has produced mandatory guidance on the cost-effectiveness of 
drugs since 2002, and the National Board of Health and Welfare produces advisory 
guidelines for major diseases. However, whilst new technologies are increasingly being 
subjected to cost-effectiveness scrutiny in all countries, progress in embedding the criterion 
into the broader range of health services has been slower. The Netherlands has also made 
tentative progress in embedding HTA in arm’s length agencies such as the Dutch Health Care 
Insurance Board (CVZ), which examines the cost-effectiveness of various treatments, and 
monitors more generally whether the health basket is effective, rational and efficient.  
 
A general problem with operational priority setting at the local level is the complexity of the 
task, and the lack of capacity in many health systems to interpret how national goals can be 
converted into local priorities. In England, this problem was addressed by creating a national 
target-setting regime that left little room for local discretion. It was successful in addressing 
urgent national priorities, such as reducing waiting times, but led to many local anomalies 
and proved unsustainable. In contrast, in Sweden the National Centre for Priority Setting in 
Health Care (‘Prioriteringscentrum’) is a joint initiative of the national ministry and the 
association of local governments. It has been set up to promote the priority setting process, 
providing a research, development and support role for priority setting and performance 
monitoring by local government. The ‘Prioriteringscentrum’ appears to recognize the need 
for some central capacity to support local decision makers. 
 
Performance monitoring 
Notwithstanding the vastly increased potential for deploying performance measurement tools 
in modern health systems, and the large number of experiments under way, there remain 
many unresolved debates about how best to use performance data to best effect. Health 
systems are still in the early days of performance measurement, and there remains an 
enormous agenda to improve its effectiveness. However, in all the countries surveyed, the 
policy questions of whether to collect data, and what data to collect, are rapidly being 
augmented by questions of how best to summarize and report such data, and how to integrate 
data into an effective system of governance. 
 
In principle, performance monitoring should be aligned with the coverage, quality and 
outcomes goals set out in the priority-setting task. Yet health policy is replete with examples 
of poorly articulated goals, the attainment of which cannot be readily measured or tracked 
over time. Examples include the commonly promulgated goal of reducing disparities in 
health outcomes, which is often adopted without specification of the associated metrics or 
targets. Furthermore, if localities are free to set their own priorities it becomes difficult to 
know what metrics to specify. The national role then may become one of mandating 
underlying data to be collected, rather than creating specific performance indicators. 
 
It is important to note that setting the framework for performance monitoring is essentially a 
national government responsibility, which it should either undertake directly or delegate to 
national or regional agencies. One of the most important functions of performance 
monitoring is the ability to compare institutions seeking to deliver the same sorts of services. 
Only by specifying a common reporting framework can such comparison be affected. This 
need for a nationally agreed specification of performance metrics becomes even stronger in 
more decentralized systems of care, when direct control of services is less feasible, and 
benchmarking and comparison assumes central importance. 
 
It is noteworthy that all countries surveyed have to some extent recognized the need for 
relatively well-resourced national agencies or independent bodies to specify, collect, analyze 
and disseminate comparative performance information. Thus, although many national 
systems of performance monitoring have developed piecemeal and opportunistically, there 
have increasingly been efforts to embed activities in a more coherent overarching institutional 
and conceptual framework.  
 
As well as the scope of performance data, an important element of performance monitoring is 
the format in which performance data are presented. Critical choices in this domain are: the 
contents of summary reports of performance; the level at which performance is reported 
(practitioner or organization); whether reports are made public; the extent to which 
organizations are ranked according to performance; and the extent to which individual 
performance metrics are aggregated into summary measures of attainment. There is little 
evidence to date to inform practice and few signs so far that the public choose their providers 
based on performance public reporting. 
 
Most of the countries covered in this paper require some element of periodic performance 
reporting by provider organizations, and have put in place – or contracted – national arm’s 
length agencies to promote that function. Examples include the Öppna jämförelser in 
Sweden, the AQUA Institute in Germany, the Care Quality Commission in England, and the 
proposed National Health Performance Authority in Australia.  
 
Accountability 
The accountability element is the least well-developed aspect of health system leadership and 
governance. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify four classes of accountability 
mechanism: 
 Market-based systems of choice, under which patients or insurers or both are able to exert 
pressure on providers to improve quality, responsiveness and prices through the threat to 
take business elsewhere; 
 Systems of electoral accountability, under which relevant authorities are subjected to 
periodic electoral scrutiny, with the associated threat of loss of office; 
 Direct incentives through managerial control, or payment mechanisms designed to 
improve quality or ensure minimum standards; 
 Accountability of providers to professional oversight and control. 
 
It is rare to see any of these systems operating in isolation and in practice most countries 
operate a mix of systems. However, the important requirement is that accountability 
mechanisms should contain incentives for providers of services to scrutinize and act 
appropriately upon their reported performance. 
 
Almost all health systems contain elements of the above types of accountability. Most 
notably, any provider payment mechanism will implicitly offer some incentives to providers 
[36]. The key issue is whether such incentives are aligned with system goals. In practice, 
many existing accountability mechanisms have developed through a mixture of historical 
accident and political expediency, and it is rare to find any that they have been designed with 
the goal of system improvement explicitly in mind. 
 
The countries surveyed emphasize different aspects of accountability. The Netherlands has 
placed most reliance on markets, regulated by a number of information and competition 
agencies. England appears to be moving in the same direction. Sweden and Switzerland have 
emphasized local democratic accountability, although there is some question over whether 
electorates have access to adequate information on which to base their judgments. Germany 
carefully promotes market instruments but for the main part continues to rely on a 
‘corporatist’ system of delegated responsibility and consensus amongst the various 
stakeholders. Norway, through the four regional health authorities, has placed more reliance 
on direct command and control, through the setting of annual plans and contracts. Australia 
has a more heterodox approach that involves negotiation with stakeholders and – like the 
Netherlands and Switzerland – places considerable weight on professional accountability. It 
has set up a new national oversight body for the health professions, the Australian Health 
Practitioners Regulation Agency. Switzerland plans the introduction of a strong regulatory 
agency, similar to the FINMA (its financial market regulatory agency) to hold health insurers 
to account.  
 
Perhaps the easiest way of examining the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms is to 
scrutinize the incentives to which they give rise. In general, the principal incentives relate to: 
financial regimes (revenue received in relation to costs and effort on the part of providers); 
loss of electoral office; the consequences of failure to meet targets and contractual 
obligations; and the removal of accreditation and ability to practice, and loss of professional 
reputation. The designer of accountability mechanisms must in principle determine whether 
the chosen incentives will provoke the desired responses amongst organizations and 
individual practitioners. 
 
Concluding comments 
This survey has underlined the importance of the national leadership and governance role in 
steering the health system towards better performance. It has described the agencies put in 
place by seven countries to fulfill the key tasks of priority setting, performance monitoring 
and accountability. The case studies have highlighted a plethora of agencies addressing 
aspects of the leadership and governance triad. However, these aspects are in general not well 
aligned, and there are considerable gaps and duplication in all systems. Table 4 summarizes 
the main lessons learned and barriers encountered in this study in each of the domains. For 
example, setting priorities involves negotiating trade-offs between national goals and local 
priorities. Monitoring performance involves agreeing on meaningful measures that are 
universally available and technically and practically feasible. Making providers accountable 
involves harmonizing strategies with incentives. 
 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
Underlying many of the initiatives described is a move away from a traditional trust in 
professional models of accountability towards more transparent approaches that are open to 
public scrutiny, particularly in the secondary care sector. The key instrument supporting this 
shift is the specification and public release of performance data, informed by goals and 
priorities, and serving a meaningful accountability process. This movement may reflect both 
an enhanced ability to collect and disseminate performance data, and increased public 
demands for transparency. We speculate that improvements in performance data may in the 
future bring to light weaknesses in priority setting and accountability mechanisms, leading to 
improvements in both, although to date evidence of this interdependency has not been strong. 
Our case studies have also highlighted the added complexities of decentralized health 
systems, in which nationally mandated priorities and data can inform local decision-making, 
but there must remain a degree of autonomy.  
 
The case studies suggest that although there seems to be reasonable consensus on broad goals 
of the health system there is quite a large variation in approaches to setting priorities. 
Performance monitoring may be the domain where there is most convergence of thinking, 
although countries are at different stages of development. It is perhaps in the third domain of 
accountability mechanisms that we have observed the greatest variation amongst the 
countries, and the greatest uncertainty as to the optimal approach to adopt. The failure to 
observe a preferred model, and the stark incentives inherent in relying on a single 
accountability model, suggest that a mix of accountability mechanisms – in the form of 
market mechanisms, electoral processes, direct financial incentives, and professional 
oversight and control – is likely to be appropriate in most settings. The important point is that 
the mechanisms should be aligned with the priority setting and monitoring processes. 
 
Finally, we have noted that although the rationale for our model of leadership and governance 
seems strong it is unlikely to emerge naturally, and its successful implementation may require 
capacity at a national, local, practitioner and citizen level. Some countries (notably Sweden) 
have recognized this. However, several promising initiatives appear to have lacked impact, 
and this may be because the targeted audience lacks the ability to understand and act on the 
information appropriately. A major role for arm’s length agencies would therefore appear to 
be to enhance understanding of the information they provide, and to help recipients make 
appropriate decisions, whether they are politicians, managers, clinicians, patients or payers. 
The current challenges for these health systems include setting realistic priorities based on 
sustainable financing, performance monitoring that encourages rather than stifles innovation, 
and designing accountability mechanisms that strengthen rather than undermine professional 
responsibility. 
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Table 1 Population, health spending and health outcomes by country  
 
(a) Australia United 
Kingdom 
Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland 
Population 
(millions 
2009) 
21.3 61.6 82.2 16.6 4.8 9.2 7.6 
Total 
health exp 
% GDP 
(2008) 
8.5 8.7 10.5 9.9 8.5 9.4 10.7 
General 
govt exp on 
health as % 
of total 
health exp 
(2008) 
65.4 82.6 74.6 75.3 78.6 
 
78.1 59.1 
Health 
expenditure 
per capita 
PPP$ 
(2008) 
3365 3222 3922 4233 5207 3622 4815 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(2009) 
82 80 80 81 81 81 82 
(b)        
amenable 
mortality 
2006-07 of 
all causes 
ages 0-74  
56.9 82.5  76.4 65.6 63.6 61.3 53.1 (*) 
% change 
amenable 
mortality 
1997-98 to 
2006-07 
-35.3 -34.7 -28.0 -32.3 -35.5 -30.7 -18.7 (**) 
Source: (a) WHO 2011 [22]; (b) Nolte & McKee 2011 [23]; (*) average 2004-2008, 
calculation of the health administration of Ticino; (**) compared to average 1998-
2002. 
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Table 2 Health system characteristics by country 
 
 Australia England 
 
Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland 
Form of 
government 
Federal Unitary Federal Unitary Unitary Unitary Federal 
Main source 
health 
revenue 
General 
taxes 
General 
taxes 
wage-related 
contributions 
wage-related  
contributions 
and 
community-
rated  
premiums 
General 
taxes 
General 
taxes 
Community-
rated 
premiums  
Health 
cover 
finance 
agency 
 
National 
health 
insurance 
scheme  
National 
health 
service 
160 sickness 
funds 
health 
insurers  
Regional 
and local 
authorities 
Regional 
and local 
authorities 
80 health 
insurers and 
26 cantons 
Governance 
in health 
system 
 
National 
and  state 
govts  
National 
health 
department 
Corporate Corporate National National 
& counties 
Traditionally 
cantons, but 
increasing 
role played 
by the 
federal 
government 
Hospital 
ownership 
 
State 
govt 
public 
hospitals 
(70% 
beds), 
private 
hospitals 
Mainly 
public 
Mixed public 
and private 
Private not-
for-profit/  
NGOs 
National 
govt (4 
regional 
offices) 
21 
counties 
Public & 
private 
Physician 
employment 
 
Mainly 
private 
Mainly 
public or 
under govt 
contract 
Mainly 
private 
Mainly 
private 
Local 
govts 
contract & 
private 
physicians 
County 
employees 
Mainly 
private 
 
Source: Paper authors; The Commonwealth Fund (2010) International profiles of 
health care systems. New York. 
 29 
 
Table 3: Examples of Agencies Involved in Health System Governance in the 
Seven Countries 
 
 Priority Setting Performance 
Monitoring 
Accountability 
Australia • Council of Australian Governments 
• Australian Department of Health 
and Ageing 
• State and territory health 
departments 
• Australian Health Ministers’ 
Conference 
• National E-Health Transition 
Authority  
• Australian National Preventive 
Health Agency 
•  
• Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 
• Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in 
Health Care 
• National Health 
Performance Authority 
• Hospital Pricing 
Authority 
• Government 
health 
departments 
• Accrediting 
agencies 
• Australian 
Health 
Practitioners 
Regulation 
Agency 
England • Care Quality Commission 
• National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
• Care Quality 
Commission 
• Dr Foster 
• Office of National 
Statistics 
• The Health 
ministry 
Germany • Federal Joint Committee (GBA, 
members: Federal Association of 
SHI Physicians,  Federal 
Association of Sickness Funds,  
German Hospital Federation) 
• Institute for Quality and Efficiency 
in Health Care (IQWiG) 
• AQUA (formerly by the 
Federal Office for 
Quality Assurance) 
• Organization for 
Transparency and 
Quality in Health Care 
• Federal Joint 
Committee 
(GBA) 
• Federal Chamber 
of Physicians 
• Federal 
Insurance 
Authority (BVA) 
Netherlands • Health Council 
• Health Care Insurance Board 
(CVZ) 
• Medicines Evaluation Board 
(CBG) 
• National Institute for 
Public Health and 
Environment (RIVM) 
• Health Care 
Inspectorate 
(IGZ) 
• Health Care 
Authority (NZa) 
Norway • Regional Health Authorities 
• Norwegian Council for Quality 
Improvement and Priority Setting 
in Health Care 
• Health ministry 
(hospitals) 
• Municipalities (primary 
care) 
• Norwegian 
Board of Health 
Supervision 
Sweden • Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs 
• Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Agency (TLV) 
• National Board of Health 
and Welfare 
• Association of County 
Councils 
• Quality Registers 
(individual conditions) 
• County councils/ 
local government 
 
Switzerland • Federal Service Board 
• Medical Board (cantons) 
• Federal Office of 
Statistics 
• Patient Safety 
Foundation 
• SwissDRG 
• Swiss medical 
association 
(FMH) and other 
professional 
organizations 
 30 
 
 
Table 4:  Lessons learned and barriers encountered 
 
Strategies Tasks Lessons learned Barriers encountered 
Set priorities Set national goals Broad national goals 
must translate into 
achievable local targets 
Conflicts between 
national and local 
priorities 
Build networked 
governance 
Involve key 
stakeholders  
Capture by powerful 
vested interests 
Monitor performance Agree uniform 
performance indicators 
Establish well-
resourced performance 
monitoring agency 
Conflicts between 
central and local 
priorities  
Establish a national 
reporting framework 
Clarify aim of reporting 
framework 
Provider suspicions 
about political rationale 
Data collection and 
analysis 
Articulate clear 
technical requirements 
Lack of capacity and 
coordination, technical 
difficulties 
Make providers 
accountable 
Establish accountability 
mechanisms 
Apply multiple 
mechanisms, offer 
incentives and sanctions 
Lack of regulatory and 
enforcement capacity 
Align strategies Harmonise regulatory 
agencies  
Disconnect between 
different accountability 
mechanisms  
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Figure 1: A Cybernetic Model of Health System Leadership and Governance 
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Annex 1: Questions for country case studies 
 
General information 
1. Please describe how priorities are set for improving health system actions and 
standards. Who is involved? What is the role of arm’s length agencies? What is the 
evidence base for decision-making? What are the main strengths and weaknesses? 
2. How is performance monitored? By whom? What are the main strengths and 
weaknesses of current approaches to monitoring performance? 
3. How is accountability for performance ensured? How are the accountability 
mechanisms in place linked to the health system’s broader governance structures? 
Are the mechanisms effective? 
4. To what extent are the three components (priority setting, performance monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms) aligned? 
 
The role of arm’s length agencies 
5. Please describe the use of an arm’s length agency (or agencies) to improve health 
system governance. 
6. Which of the three elements of leadership and governance do these agencies mainly 
reflect (priority setting, performance monitoring or accountability)? 
7. What were the preconditions needed to make their implementation feasible?  
8. Did they require significant new capacity? Of what sort? How was additional 
capacity created? 
9. What have been the successes and failures of the agencies, and are there specific 
barriers to their proper functioning? 
10. What are the three main things needed to enhance their effectiveness in the future?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
